I have seen no evidence of such a proclamation, John.
Perhaps other folks have a better notion of counterintelligence strategy than I do, but the way I understand things is that if you have identified a situation, like a tunnel or an agent in place, it is often better to let the situation keep functioning in an ambiguous fashion. That is, you can choose at any point to shut it down, but while it functions, you are able to trace much of the information and materiel that flows through. You end up with a much more valuable asset if you continue to allow it to function and to expose the various distribution pipelines through which the information and materiel flows and through which management of the asset arrives.
It becomes a gift that keeps on giving for you.
If you shut it down, you may stop the flow of information and materiel for an undetermined amount of time, but the other folks involved, the enemy, will always be clear which information and which agents are compromised and which aren't. If you shut down some, then you introduce a certain amount of paranoia into the situation, which becomes better, and makes the enemy turn on his own agents in an almost random fashion, depending on which stresses you place on their system. Skillfully done, one intelligence system can make another virtually dismantle itself. It becomes almost impossible to distinguish between information and disinformation, reality and fantasy.
Some would say the the old KGB had the CIA in this bind through much of the cold war, and used the CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angelton to destroy the effectiveness of the Agency from within with a series of internal witch-hunts. Some say that Angleton may have been a KGB Double himself. Some say that Angleton never succeeded in reaching the bottom of the most devious set of espionage maneuvers in history and died a broken man.
Whatever the truth, this has the hallmarks of a brilliant operation, leading back to the very beginnings of the cold war.
What we're talking about in Gaza, leaving functional tunnels in place is simply standard operating procedure.
The economics of the thing suggest that food and relief supplies would probably crowd out war materiel for the majority of the smuggled goods, and that the guns versus butter issues, as economists like to call this sort of thing, has probably reached some sort of market equilibrium.
One might examine the number of trucks full of food coming in versus the number of body bags being buried and see if there is some sort of change on one side or the other. A marked change in one or the other would suggest market forces have shifted in one or the other direction. Our figures aren't all that good, as the fudging we've witnessed so far would seem to suggest, but the figures would probably have to be clear and steady, amounting to a trend, and that should be visible.
What are my sources?
This is an analysis of data and a piece of opinion, and as such, I'm not offering that sort of support. I'm using data that you folks have supplied and sorting it the best I can. What I actually know for sure about any of this could be written on a grain of sand with room left over for battalions of angels to hold polka elimination night.
To those of you who find this obvious, my apologies. I do go on.